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I. Introduction 
The economic impact of gambling stretches much further than the few well-known tourist 
attractions of Las Vegas and Atlantic City; gambling in some form spans every state across the 
United States.  Jobs and tax revenue from casinos stimulate surrounding areas, and state-run 
lotteries generate billions in revenue.  In 2004, lotteries generated over $48 billion in consumer 
spending (Hansen, n.d.).  By definition, gambling is divided into three main categories: casino, 
betting, and lotteries.  The internet presents a new frontier for the industry providing greater 
accessibility and anonymity.  In several countries, including Belize, Austria, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Costa Rica, Australia, and the United Kingdom, internet gambling has been legalized 
with regulatory restrictions (Viaden, n.d.). The introduction of the internet as a new median 
promises to revolutionize the gambling industry in the US.   
Since the induction of the World Wide Web in 1995, the internet gambling industry has 
expanded to a billion dollar industry at record pace.  Expanded revenues can already be seen in 
several countries where internet gambling is currently legal.  The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), estimated that net wagers received via the internet in Australia increased on average 11.8 
percent per year from 2000 to 2005, from $73.1 million to $114.3 million (FaHCSIA, n.d.).  
Such estimates have been proven to be grossly underestimated.  The projected global net 
revenues of internet gambling for offshore companies was estimated to be $5.4 billion in 2009 
from players in the United States, and $25.8 billion from players worldwide (American Gaming 
Association, n.d.). In the United States, for the past decade, internet-based gambling has been at 
the forefront of several legislation proposals being discussed in Congress. Although a large 
percentage of the gross internet gambling revenue comes from the US, legalization of this 
activity in the US has not occurred.  
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The Federal Wire Act, passed in 1961, prohibits the transfer of funds for purposes of 
betting or wagering via wired communication with the legislation primarily targeted at providers 
of the service (Kindt and Joy, 2002)(Landes, 2007). This piece of legislation is heavily relied 
upon by opponents of online gambling, who argue that the law also pertains to the internet.  
However, supporters of internet gambling legalization believe it is an antiquated law and those 
who conceptualized the law were not aware of the internet's potential, thus it was not a part of 
the meaning of the law and only applies to sports betting not poker or other casino games 
(Landes, 2007).   Title VIII of the SAFE Port Act, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act (UIGEA), signed into law by President Bush in 2006, explicitly prohibits the transfer of 
funds from any institution to an internet gambling site, excluding fantasy sports, horse racing, 
and lotteries (Conon, 2009).  As the federal law states, 
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in connection 
with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling— 
(1) credit, or the proceeds of credit, extended to or on behalf of such other person (including 
credit extended through the use of a credit card); 
(2) an electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money transmitting business, 
or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money transmitting service, from or on behalf of 
such other person; 
(3) any check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on behalf of such other person 
and is drawn on or payable at or through any financial institution; or 
(4) the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction, as the Secretary and the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System may jointly prescribe by regulation, which involves a 
financial institution as a payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or for the benefit of such 
other person. 
 
The law targets the providers of internet gambling rather than the individual consumers.  The 
general consensus presented by the typical rulings made by several courts is that internet games 
based on skill, such as online poker, are exempt from these laws.  While this interpretation is 
technically untrue because skill based games have yet to receive exemption through amendments 
to the UIGEA, such games, especially online poker, are a widely spread internet activity that is 
difficult to prosecute. 
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Online gambling’s legal status has yet to be well defined due to the political implications 
that accompany such a controversial activity.  The median voter theory suggests that politicians 
can capture the most votes by submitting to the preferences of the median voter.  Because 
gambling has often been viewed as an activity that promotes moral and religious degradation, 
politicians do not want to upset their constituency by implementing legislation to legalize the 
activity (Simmons, 2005).  However, the potential billions that can be reaped from the new tax 
revenue source is a strong incentive for political leaders to legalize and regulate online gambling.  
A strong concern is the potential for gaming sites to capture the politicians and support them 
financially in exchange for lenient regulation standards.  But political hurdles are not the motive 
behind online gambling being subjected to the most stringent form of regulation: prohibition.  
This course of action has been taken as a result of the strong potential for market failure in this 
industry caused by negative externalities and asymmetric information.  Legalization of this 
industry in the United States, with certain regulatory rules in place, would reduce the potential 
for market failure and thus reduce the need for such stringent regulatory intervention in this 
market. 
There are several micro economic tools that can help determine the impact of legalization 
and regulation of online gambling on society and individuals.  The low start-up costs in 
comparison to resort casinos and the few barriers to entry make this a competitive market.  
Considering there are currently consumers who seek out gambling sites regardless of its legality, 
and that there are certain countries such as Alderney, where internet gambling is legal and sites 
are allowed to accept wagers from other countries (Viaden, n.d.), one can assume a relatively 
inelastic demand curve concerning internet gambling in general and a high elasticity for 
individual sites.  Adding to this competitive market, the negative externalities can show 
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significant shifts of social welfare.  One must also take into account the impact legalization will 
have on substitutes and compliments associated with online gambling, such as casino gambling 
and resort tourism.  On an individual level, one can examine risk aversion and utility theory to 
view the effects on demand.  There has been much discussion concerning the positive and 
negative effects on the individual and society associated with internet-based gambling.  In order 
to investigate this further, I will add an analytical framework to this discussion using micro-
economic tools, and provide an economic background to show that the suggested form of 
licensing regulation, will be able to mitigate the issues associated with legalization of online 
gambling in the United States. 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  The next section includes a review of 
the current literature on internet gambling.  The third section explains the causes of market 
failure in the internet gambling industry.  Section four imparts an economics analysis of the 
social and individual issues surrounding internet-based gambling.  Section five consist of a 
consideration of how legalization and regulation could ameliorate the potential for market failure 
and generate overall benefits for the United States in terms of tax revenue and enhanced social 
welfare.  Section six provides the limitation of this paper.  The last section concludes this paper.  
 
II. Literature Review  
The striking difference between traditional casino gambling and internet-based gambling 
is the anonymity the internet provides consumers and producers.  Internet gambling raises 
several security issues including minors having access to gambling, lack of security regarding 
consumers’ financial information, possibility of money laundering through the sites, and lack of 
accountability should a problem arise.  These security concerns have led to a number of 
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economic studies on the potential effects of legalization of online gambling in the United States.  
Economists have been particularly interested in the negative externalities associated with 
legalization and their potential social impact.  However, there has been little attention 
concentrated on an economic analysis of the impact of these externalities and the influence of 
regulation.   
Existing literature that is in part related to the social impact of these externalities is that of 
Landes (2007) and Clarke and Dempsey (2001) who consider the issues of underage gamblers, 
lack of consumer security, and lack of accountability of offshore sites.  Landes (2007) compares 
how the security measures that are in place to protect consumers in traditional casino gambling 
are not available when it comes to online gambling because of the inherent nature of the internet.  
The internet is globally accessible and easily manipulated by those with technical skills, thus it is 
very difficult to monitor the millions of transactions that are made each day.  Clarke and 
Dempsey (2001) explain the purposes of regulation, and in doing so list several negative 
externalities associated with online gambling that could be mitigated with government 
regulation.  Both papers suggest the existence of strong potential negative externalities 
associated with internet-based gambling, and come to the conclusion that prohibition is an 
ineffectual approach and licensing is the best alternative.  However neither explicitly analyzes 
how these externalities will affect the market or how licensing will contribute to the effects. 
Instead of suggesting a government or external body implemented regulation such as 
licensing, Miller (2006) concentrates his study almost entirely on inter-market approaches to 
regulation, and most particularly on the need for self-regulation and alternative dispute 
resolution.  Such resolution would be in the form of providing a means through which consumers 
can voice their concerns and receive help regarding disputed winnings, all in a effort to curb 
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consumers’ perceptions of risk associated with internet gambling sites.  Risk – actual and 
perceived – is an important factor when considering how regulation will affect an individual’s 
choices.  Although Miller (2006) presents the notion of an inter market industry association, 
there is no economic analysis, in terms of risk aversion or utility theory, to accompany these 
ideas or to explain how this type of regulation will affect the demand of online gambling. 
Conon (2009) counters the idea that there is a need for outside regulation, and instead 
proposes definitional clarity of existing laws and stronger criminal sanctions and enforcement.  
He explains why internet gambling legislation has been at a stand still for the last decade and 
how/when/why the law needs to adapt to the changing role online gambling has in the American 
society.  Similar to much of the literature mentioned above, Conon’s arguments are intriguing, 
however he does not analyze how stronger enforcement will affect social welfare.  
Taking Conon’s opinion a bit further, Kindt and Joy (2002) argue that not only should 
internet gambling be banned domestically, but also prohibited internationally by a United 
Nations multinational treaty.  They argue that online gambling can neither be practically nor 
functionally regulated and because of the industry’s potential to destabilize national and 
international financial institution, it should be banned outright.  They reason in support of the 
current extreme regulation of total prohibition.  I counter Kindt and Joy’s (2002) argument, 
citing the issue of the United States enduring all of the negative externalities that accompany 
online gambling without receiving the countervailing positive tax revenue. 
While the external costs on society are the area of internet gambling most focused on, the 
impact legalization will have on other gambling industries, such as traditional casino or lottery 
games, is similarly intriguing.  The question of whether or not internet gambling is a substitute or 
complement to other forms of gambling has yet to be strongly investigated.  Hunsaker (2001) 
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conducted a study to explore the impact of riverboat casinos on the demand for gambling at 
casino resorts.  She characterizes gambling as an ―experience good‖, meaning the consumers do 
not know the value they will receive from the activity until after they have engaged in it.  Her 
empirical results show that when a riverboat casino is introduced in one part of the country the 
demand for gambling at resort casinos such as Las Vegas goes up.  The theory behind this 
change in demand is that the riverboat introduces people to the act of gambling at low 
transportation costs and those who find it enjoyable travel to the resorts for a future vacation.  
Applying a similar theory to the impact internet gambling will have, legalization should increase 
the demand for resort casino gambling because the internet introduces consumers to the activity 
at no transportation costs.  However, the true impact on other forms of gambling cannot be 
deduced without an empirical study. 
The research closest to the present paper is that of Simmons (2005), which provides an 
analysis of traditional casino gambling in the United States using micro economic tools.  He 
introduces gambling through an expected utility function (with variables – wealth, winnings, 
stake, and probability of winning).  Risk aversion of individuals contributes to modeling of the 
demand function of gambling.  Simmons introduces the argument that there are two separate 
categories of negative effects of gambling: the intra-household transfers (i.e. debt, strained 
family relationships, etc.), and the negative social externalities (i.e. crime).  I will follow 
Simmons’ example and use some of the micro economic tools he presents and apply them to the 
emerging internet gambling market. 
Another important aspect of Simmons’ analysis of gambling is his explanation of the 
price of gambling.  Before analyzing the potential effects of legalization of internet gambling, the 
price of internet gambling must be clearly defined.  The most common demand model for 
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gambling relies on calculating the price of gambling by taking the face value of a gamble minus 
the expected value of monetary returns per wager.  Simmons introduces this pricing model 
through the ―take out‖, generally equivalent to the house advantage1, which is the price paid to 
make a one dollar wager.  Because internet gambling sites and traditional casinos function on a 
similar operating base, this definition of price is easily applied to internet gambling with a slight 
alteration to account for the non-gambling risks (i.e. fraud, identity theft, money laundering) 
associated with unregulated internet gambling.  For the purposes of this paper, the price of 
internet gambling will be calculated by the effective price model plus the expected value of any 
cost associated with non-gambling risks and the penalty of getting caught doing an illegal 
activity.  For example, if the face value of a wager is $100 and the house take is 5%, then the 
price of that gamble would be, $100 – p($95) + ($ value of non-gambling risks), because the 
house only pays out 95 cents to every dollar and there is an added element of risk with online 
gambling versus casino gambling. 
 
III. Market Failure 
There is a strong potential for market failure in the internet-based gambling industry.  
First through the negative externalities as mentioned above, including the potential for an 
increase in the number of addicted gamblers, which would lead to greater social costs from 
counseling and other support services, decreased revenue from local casinos, destruction of 
family life that includes debt, bankruptcy, and divorce, increased crime such as money 
laundering and fraud, and lack of consumer security on the internet resulting in identity theft, and 
                                                 
1
 The winning probability of a casino game is generally in favor of the house.  This advantage or edge is how the 
casinos make money off wagers.  As explained by About.com, ―If you bet a dollar and was paid a dollar when you 
won, you would be paid true odds. However if the casino paid you 95 cents every time you won instead of a dollar 
the House edge would be 2.5%.  Simply put, the house edge is the difference between the true odds and the odds 
that the casino pays you when you win. (About.com, n.d.) 
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underage users who could incur debt on a parent’s credit card (Kindt and Joy, 2002). As Figure 1 
shows, such negative externalities result in a supply of internet gambling, especially from 
overseas sites, that is greater than the socially optimal output.  A federal Pigouvian tax charged 
to the providers of the activity in the amount of the difference between private marginal cost 
(PMC) and social marginal cost (SMC) would help mitigate the issue of excess supply by 
increasing the costs of operation and thus decreasing the supply to the socially optimal level and 
eliminating welfare loss. 
            S = SMC 
       $                S = PMC 
  
 
 
 
       D = SMB 
       Q internet gambling 
Figure 1: Negative Externality Cause of Market Failure 
The negative externalities of addicted and underage gamblers, security risks, and crime (money 
laundering, fraud, etc.) are costs imposed on third parties (i.e. society) for which they are not 
compensated, resulting in the indicated welfare loss. 
 
Along with this, one of the biggest negative externalities can be associated with another 
cause of market failure – asymmetric information.  The trustworthiness of unregulated sites is 
questionable at best, and many sites employ people who have the coding knowledge to ―fix 
sites‖, meaning they can alter the odds of winning in favor of the site (more so than a standard 
house advantage).  As Figure 2 shows, sites can ―rig‖ the probability of winning a game in their 
    Renosto 11 
favor.  As a result the perceived demand is much greater than the actual or socially optimal 
demand, thus output is greater than the socially optimal output 
 
 $          S 
 
 
 
 
 
   Dactual           Dperceived 
      Qoptimal    Qmarket failure  Qinternet gamlbing 
Figure 2: Asymmetric Information Cause of Market Failure 
In the case of online gambling, the supplier (the site organizer or controller) has more information that the 
consumers in that there is very little a consumer can determine concerning the ―fairness‖ of the games.  
Perceived demand is greater than actual demand, resulting in the indicated social welfare loss. 
 
IV. Economic Analysis 
This economic analysis of the legalization and regulation of internet-based gambling will 
be broken into two sections. The first will examine the market as whole (consumers and 
producers) and the potential effects on social welfare, while the second will look into how such 
actions will affect an individual’s perceptions of risk and utility function. 
4.1 Market Analysis 
Internet gambling can be considered a competitive market due to the potentially large 
number of service providers and the few existing barriers to entry.  Technically, anyone can 
create a casino website at a fairly low overhead costs and thus begin receiving profits right away.  
The cost of constructing and staffing a traditional casino may be $300 million, while a gaming 
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site requires much lower investment (Clarke and Dempsey, 2001).  In addition, the demand for 
internet gambling can be argued to be somewhat price inelastic considering that some people 
currently are willing to gamble online regardless of the activity’s illegal status in the United 
States.  One effect that legalization may have on the industry is an increase in demand.  As 
Conon (2009) argues, people generally follow and respect the law, thus if the activity becomes 
legal those who chose not to do so now may choose to participate in the future.  As Figure 3 
shows, on the supply side of the market, legalization will most likely increase the supply as the 
United States presents a potentially large market demand.   
SMC1 
    SMC1              SMC2 
$               SMC2   $              PMC1 
               PMC1                                    PMC2 
        PMC2 
 
 
 
 
 
  
        D                D1      D2 
                    
        QIG          QIG 
   (a)       (b) 
Figure 3: Supply and Demand of Online Gambling 
The yellow in diagram b shows the social welfare loss from negative externalities after the increases in 
supply and demand.  A Pigouvian tax would mitigate this area, leaving the shaded area showing the total 
increase in social welfare.  
 
Conon’s (2009) argument that people generally follow the law out of respect can be 
extended to producers.  Suppliers of online gambling for the most part do not conduct business 
with in the United States or with customers from the United States because doing so would be a 
violation of the country’s laws.  This restraint is in part out of respect for the law and in part 
because the risks of getting caught and prosecuted while the activity is illegal are too high.  
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Diagram (a) of Figure 3 shows the inelastic demand curve of internet gambling as well as the 
effect legalizing the activity would have on supply.  Supply would increase from PMC1 and the 
socially optimal level SMC1 to PMC2 and SMC2.  If the perceived and actual risks associated 
with online gambling decrease, demand will increase.  Diagram (b) combines these effects and 
the shaded area shows the overall increase social welfare with an imposed Pigouvian tax. 
The effects of legalization will not be concentrated solely on the online gambling market.  
Several substitutes and complements will be affected as well, in particular the casino and resort 
tourism markets.  Conon (2009) presents the economic multiplier effect of gambling dollars 
referring to the fact that ―’normal consumer spending benefits the economy by more than just the 
amount spent‖’.  While this multiplier does apply to dollars spent on normal casino gambling 
(casino consumption contributes to jobs and tourism of the surrounding area), it would be hard to 
argue that the effect applies to internet gambling considering sites employ only a few people and 
there certainly is not tourism associated with internet gambling.  On the contrary Hunsaker’s 
(2001) findings that the introduction of riverboat casinos positively affects demand for resort 
casinos indicates that internet gambling may have a similar effect on such industries. Seen in 
Figure 4, if online gambling becomes legal, some will view the easier access as a substitute for 
having to travel to a casino and stay in a resort/hotel.  Thus the demand for online gambling will 
increase, resulting in a decrease in demand for casino gambling.  In contrast, some may view 
internet gambling as a low transportation cost way to test their enjoyment of gambling, and if 
they enjoy it, may chose to spend their next vacation at a resort casino.  In such a case, the 
increase in demand for internet gambling will result in an increase in demand for casino 
gambling as well. 
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Figure 4:  The Effects of Legalization of Internet Gambling on the Resort Casino Gambling Industry  
Opening a new market in the United States will affect existing ones, most particularly traditional casinos 
and resort tourism.  The first diagram shows an increase in the demand for internet gambling (IG).  The 
diagram in the middle shows Hunsaker’s (2001) argument that IG is a complement to casino gambling 
(CG), while the third diagram depicts Conon’s (2009) argument that IG and CG are substitutes.  Whether 
or not internet gambling will affect these industries as a substitute or complement has yet to be seen.  
 
4.2 Individual Consumer Analysis 
There are several opaque vulnerabilities to be wary of when considering the internet.  In 
particular, there are several negative externalities associated with online gambling.  To begin 
there is the social cost of underage users.  Clearly the current gambling age limit was enacted to 
protect minors and to ensure that those participating in the activity are fully capable of making 
informed decisions.  While casino gambling has fairly full-proof prevention against underage 
gamblers in the form of presenting identification before being allowed into an establishment, the 
internet is not endowed with a comparable age verification check, presenting a potential social 
cost.   
Security is another, potentially devastating, externality.  In casinos, consumers can 
monitor all transactions; on the internet however, hackers or the sites themselves can steal 
financial information.  The lack of accountability of offshore sites that are frequented by many 
Americans creates another strong negative externality.  
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Market and social welfare is dependent upon individuals’ demand, and "gambling is a 
principle inherent in human nature" as Edmund Burke stated in a speech before the House Of 
Commons (1780).  The reason several Americans choose to use offshore gambling sites is due to 
the expected utility they believe they will receive.  Simmons’ (2005) presentation of the expected 
utility of casino gambling offers a good formula that can be applied to internet gambling.  
Simmons’ formula: E(U) = pU(W + G) + (1-p)U(W - S), takes into consideration the variables – 
U = utility, W = wealth, G = winnings, S = stake, and P = probability of winning a wager. The 
expected utility of a game is calculated by multiplying the probability of each outcome by the 
value of the outcome.   According to Simmons’ formula, the value of the high outcome is wealth 
plus winnings and the value of the low outcome is wealth minus stake.  When calculating the 
expected utility of gambling one must also take into account the diminishing marginal utility of 
money.  As the amount that one wins increases, the utility received from each continued increase 
in winnings is less than the utility received from the previous increase in winnings.  Diminishing 
marginal utility of money indicates a concave utility function.  In addition, the utility gained 
from gambling can be two-fold, utility from the potential winnings received and from gambling 
as a consumption good or social activity. 
Figure 5 shows the effect legalization would have on an individual’s calculated utility of 
a gamble.  Due to the nature of a gamble, the utility function shows the low outcome, a loss of 
one’s money, as negative returns.  If there is a perception that a game is ―rigged‖ from lack of 
regulation, then the overall total utility of playing the game is suboptimal.  If a consumer knows 
he is participating in a fair gamble, then his total utility for any given wager will increase from 
TU1 to TU2 because his perceptions of non-gambling related risks (i.e. fraud, identity theft, 
prosecution) have been decreased, if not eliminated, by regulation.  Thus, legalization and 
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regulation would decrease the disutility from risk, and for any given wager, the consumer will 
receive greater utility.  
             Utility  
          TU2 
             TU1 
          
     
 
     
  
 
 
 
Losses      L           E(L)   W                 Winnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Utility Theory and Risk Aversion Associate with Online Gambling 
We assume that even if a person loses all of his money when gambling he still gets some value/utility 
from the activity itself.  The expected utility of a game is calculated by multiplying the probability of each 
outcome by the value of the outcome.  The red line segments represent the disutility from risk. 
 
Expected utility is the amount of happiness or utility one will receive from a wager, while 
expected value is the monetary value one believes he will receive from a wager given the 
probability of winning and loosing.  Both are similar in that they influence a person’s 
consumption decision.  The ability of overseas accounts to ―rig‖ games, or skew the probabilities 
in favor of the house (site) influences one’s perception of the risks involved in gambling.  Figure 
5 follows the common assumption that most people are risk averse, meaning they will generally 
refuse a fair gambling because the expected utility from the wager is less than the constant utility 
they have without the wager.   
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The question brought up most often when researching gambling and utility theory, is how 
a person can simultaneously gamble and buy insurance.  As Simmons (2005) explains, ―only a 
risk averse person would be prepared to pay a premium to reduce a risk by purchasing insurance.  
[Yet] someone who buys a lottery ticket effectively pays to take on risk, since the expected 
returns are known to be negative‖.  The fact that gambling can be viewed as a consumption good 
or social activity allows one to model the utility of internet gambling through a risk averse 
individual.  Figure 5 shows that even with negative expected returns, a consumer will receive 
positive utility.  I argue this result is legitimate because of the fact that gambling can be viewed 
as a social activity, and the utility from the social aspect contributes positive utility.  Using risk 
theory one can see how legalization may increase the expected utility of gambling by reducing 
the risk individuals perceive when considering this activity, by eliminating the probability of 
getting caught participating in an illegal activity and by reducing the potential for sites to ―rig‖ 
the outcomes, making the element of chance constant.  
When the perceived risks are reduced, the risk-returns ratio is increased.  Figure 6 depicts 
the indifference curves associated with the risk-returns ratio.  The straight lines represent the 
market-determined trade-off (TO) between risk and returns, and the curves represent an 
individual’s indifference curves (IC).  If the risks associated with online gambling are reduced 
when the activity is legalized, then for any given wager, the risk-returns ratio will increase.  That 
is, as a wager gets more risky (i.e. higher stakes), the payoff one is likely to receive is greater 
after legalization than before.  The shift between TO1 and TO2 results in a shift from IC1 to IC2, 
where the individual is at a higher indifference curve than before.   Being on a higher 
indifference curve indicates an individual will receive greater utility from a wager with a specific 
calculated risk.  For example, if a person places a wager with X amount of risk while internet 
    Renosto 18 
gambling is illegal, and has the potential to win Y returns on that wager, then legalization would 
increase the potential returns to Z (where Z > Y).  Shown in Figure 6, the greater returns 
accompanying the wager of the legal activity at X risk results in greater utility from making that 
wager. 
Returns      
       
            IC2        TO2 
 
       
              IC1 
   Z 
             TO1 
 
 
    Y          
 
           
            Risk       
          X            
          
Figure 6: Indifference Curves and Risk-Returns Ration  
Reducing the risk of penalty associated with internet gambling increases the risk-returns ratio and raises 
an individual to a higher indifference curve. 
 
If legalization decreases the non-gambling related risk of internet gambling, then a 
consumer’s indifference curves would shift to accommodate this greater utility per wager.  
Diagram (a) in Figure 7 shows how the indifference curves would rotate and become steeper, 
indicating an increased preference for internet gambling.  In addition, if legalization increases the 
expected value of any give wager, then looking at one’s budget constraint for gambling versus a 
bundle of all other goods (Diagram (b), Figure 7), the budget constraint would rotate outward 
because one could afford to ―purchase‖ more internet gambling with his money.  A reduction in 
the price of gambling would lead to an increase in the quantity demanded of gambling.  This, in 
combination with the increased utility from less risk, which resulted in a change in tastes and 
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preferences, would lead to an increase in the overall ―purchase‖ of internet gambling and thus 
result in an increase in the demand for internet gambling (Figure 3).   
Other Goods     Other Goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          IC1 
              
IC1
   
IC2 
             IC2       IC’1        
IC’2 
    BC       Int. Gamb.   BC1        BC2 Int. Gamb. 
 
  (a)       (b) 
Figure 7: Budget Constraints and Indifference curves 
The change in tastes and preferences from the increased utility per wager results in a new set of 
indifference curves.  These steeper indifference curves imply an increase in the demand for internet 
gambling. 
 
V. Policy Suggestions 
Several suggestions have been made regarding the implementation of regulation should 
online gambling become legal.  In order to mitigate the negative externalities, some economists 
suggest licensing as a signal to consumers that the site has government (or some impartial 
external body) certification and thus is more trustworthy.  Others suggest the government-
sanctioned sale of internet domain names to earn extra revenue.   Finally, some believe an 
implementation of operating disclosure on part of the sites should be a requirement to operate.   
 As prohibition is an extreme form of regulation and, in my opinion, not necessary for this 
industry, legalization and licensing regulation is the social welfare maximizing option 
concerning online gambling.  Licensing will not alleviate all of the negative externalities simply 
due to the nature of the internet as there is always the possibility that those experienced enough 
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could ―hack‖ and ―rig‖ almost anything.  However, the tax revenue gained from legalization will 
offset the impact of the negative externalities.  
Belize is one of several countries that has legalized online gambling and issues licenses 
of gaming sites wanting to operate with in their borders.  Licenses are granted on a yearly basis, 
requiring a $10,000 down payment, as well as an annual $10,000 renewal fee (Viaden, n.d.).   
The main issue concerning licensing is deciding who will be the governing body that 
issues, adjusts, and manages the licenses.  One option would be to follow the example of other 
nations and allow/rely upon independent sites to decide if a site meets the minimal requirements 
for certification.  There are several organizations that currently service overseas markets 
including eCommerce and Online Gaming Regulation and Assurance (eCOGRA) – founded by 
online gambling companies.  ECOGRA is an example of inter market self-regulation that 
requires impartial inspection and review.  Other organizations used by overseas markets to test 
and audit internet gambling sites, include Certified Fair Gambling [CFG] and Technical System 
Testing [TST] (Viaden, n.d.).  While third party organizations such as these may very well be 
legitimate, they have the potential to be ―captured‖ by gambling sites to ―adjust‖ their finding in 
exchange for large monetary compensation.  As a result, I argue that the federal government is 
the best option for maintaining regulatory control.  While the government is not immune from 
capture, there are enough checks and balances that could hopefully detect such capture and 
eliminate it.  The government would be the best choice for a regulatory body because it is 
assumed the government functions to maximize the social welfare of its citizens and thus would 
be trusted enough to determine the legitimacy of a site.  If the government issues a list of which 
sites have licensing and have been approved, then people can make their choices with better 
information.   
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Before a site receives its certification, it must meet certain regulatory prerequisites.  The 
site must disclose operating/security/financial structures, such as where its financial backing 
comes from, standard payment sites such as PayPal, Neteller, Firepay and how it will verify the 
age of gamblers, and it must undergo an examination to make sure the games are fair.  Also, in 
order to alleviate the potential intra-household transfers, sites should be required to provide and 
advertise counseling directed at public awareness of the problems associated with pathological 
gamblers and offer affordable treatment.   Finally, to alleviate consumer complaints, sites must 
agree to some type of dispute resolution – be it through a third party site such as Independent 
Betting Adjudication Service (IBAS) in the UK, which provides dispute solutions between 
gambling operators and gamblers (Viaden, n.d.) – or just employees from the site being available 
to address consumers.  Thus the security risks to consumer will be reduced and underage users 
will be prohibited and new sites will enter the market that otherwise may have stayed out of the 
US market due to fears of prosecution.  More people will choose to participate in the activity, 
increasing demand, and more sites will be available to fulfill demand, leaving the market with a 
greater contribution to social welfare.  
 
VI. Paper Limitations 
This analysis is limited to a micro economic framework.  While many of the arguments 
concerning online gambling are traditionally viewed through a micro economic lens, analyzing 
how these issues play into the national and international economies overall could contribute to 
the current discussion.  A macro-economic model, outside the scope of just the gambling market, 
could contribute a greater understanding of how the legalization of online gambling will affect 
the economy both foreign and domestic.  In addition, while it was briefly mentioned in this 
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paper, analyzing the impact legalization and subsequently increased demand for internet 
gambling will have on casino gambling could serve to better explain the true economic impact in 
certain local economies.  Finally, the utility theory/ risk perceptions analysis was based on an 
assumption that most of the population is risk averse.  However, whether this is true or not is an 
empirical question.  There is no empirically tested explanation of why some people gamble and 
simultaneously buy insurance.  Some gambling games (such as roulette) alone have negative 
expected values; thus it is a risk seeking activity.  Yet buying insurance is a risk averse action.  I 
argue that the expected utility of the act of gambling itself increases the expected value.  People 
continue to gamble regardless of the negative expected value, suggesting that the utility from the 
social aspect of the activity is significant.  However empirical research would need to be 
conducted in order to determine how much this offsets the negative expected value. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
This examination was done to add an analytical framework to the current discussion 
regarding legalization and regulation of internet-based gambling.  Although the negative 
externalities seem greater in number than the income transfer of new tax revenue, one must take 
into account the fact that many of these negative externalities exist regardless of the legality of 
online gambling.  While prohibition and greater prosecution of violators may alleviate some of 
these negative externalities, the probability/effectiveness of prohibition is limited due to the 
nature of the internet and the option for people to use overseas sites.  There may be an increase in 
intra-household negative externalities such as debt, bankruptcy, and divorce, but requiring sites 
to provide and advertise counseling for problem gamblers may defer this increase slightly.  
While the substitute or complement effects of increased demand for internet gambling on resort 
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casino demand is unclear, since establishments in Las Vegas and Atlantic City are huge 
international tourist attractions, bringing in billions of dollars annually, they most likely will not 
be negatively affected.  The smaller, local casinos will not be too greatly affected because they 
offer a differentiated product in that many of those who participate in gambling enjoy the social 
aspect of it as well as the tactile experience of actually going to a casino.   
Legalization and licensing regulation of internet gambling can help ameliorate the market 
failure potential in this industry.  Adding a Pigouvian tax will amend the negative externality 
cause of market failure by reducing output quantity to the socially optimal level where social 
marginal cost is equal to social marginal benefit and reducing, if not eliminating, the social 
welfare loss. The asymmetric information market failure will be resolved through the 
information sharing requirements that sites must comply with before receiving their license.  
Consumers will have all the necessary information to make decisions, thus the actual demand 
will be equal to the perceived demand, and the industry output will be the social optimal 
quantity. 
Legalization and regulation will not add new negative externalities but will help alleviate 
the current effects on social welfare by contributing a large tax revenue that will stimulate the 
economy, reduce the deficit, and the tax revenue can promote several ―multiplier effect‖ 
programs, including specific educational programs, new parks, and other construction projects, 
similar to how lottery revenues are spent. Such programs would, in turn, create jobs and increase 
social welfare, which in a sense can be considered a multiplier effect.  A reduction in the risks 
associated with online gambling will lead to new sites entering the market and increase the 
demand for the good, as well as fulfill a demand that potentially already exists but is not yet 
fulfilled due to the illegality of the activity, further adding to the improvement of social welfare. 
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